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E3.

11and after this to honor beauty in the soul more t han that
beauty which is in bodies so that if a proper soul had even a

little bloom,

this would suffice for loving and caring for

it,

and to seek and bring into being discourse that improves the
youths 11

R3.

(210b6-c3).

11in order that he may be forced to behold beauty in practices4

and laws"

(210c3-4).

belong to tbe same kind11

(210c4-5).

R4.

uand to see that all of these

E4.

11so that he may show disdain toward the beauty of bodies"

RS.

"and after the practices he should be led to the sciences so
that he may see the beauty of these11 (210c7).

R6.

(210c5-6).

"and looking at beauty in the many,

not with

regard to

the one

instant like a servant c aring for the beauty of one child or
man or practice,

being a miserable slave limited in thought;

but turning toward the wide sea of beauty,

contemplating it,

he would generate many beautiful a nd noble disc ourses and

thoughts contained within philosophy11
R7.

(210c7-d6).

11until thus strengthened and nourished he shall grasp the know
(a descrip
(210d6-el).

ledge of the following sort of beauty
tion of the Form of Beauty follows.)

The following considerations support the reason-eras dichotomy
of this scheme.
The verbs in all of the R-steps ( 11realize11, 11regard 11,
11see11) belong to that standard vocabulary within which Plato usually
describes the work of reason alone.

them,

The E-steps a s I

exhibit a more complex structure.

acts of love.

Nevertheless,

in El,

E2,

demarcated

They contain more than simple

and E3 the verb 11love11

in

various forms designates the key notion from which all actions and

attitudes - some negative

-

contained in the steps are derived.

negative attitudes displayed toward previous objects of eros are

The

clearly the result of the new positive reorientation of aspirations,

and creativity seems to be dependent on the aspirations which motivate
it.

It is my construing of 210c5-6 as E4 that needs staunch defense.
1
r. fXI 11 suggests
1 �.
is entirely negative, and its ve�b,

This step

the work

Of reason rather t han eros,

I described

above as R2.

� �()fj

especially since

�e have to consider,

it governs what

however,

the compound

within which this word appears.
This compound appears previously in
210b6, in a section which seems to me to be a step of eros, and which
appears in the scheme as E2.
In E2 the 11showing of disdain11 is in
extricably part of the erotic process of becoming a lover of all
bodies.
In view of this it does not seem to me implausible to repre
sent t he recurrence of a part of a previous E-step as an Ethan a R-step.

rather

This defense of E4 rests on the discovery of parallels in the

passage, and we shall now consider all parallels in general.
�e can
c1:L1.d.de the lower 2/3 of the path into halves, and a comparison of
these yields the following 11 Platonic equation1::

\
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E l:Rl:H2:E2 equals E3:R3:R4:E4.
The claim that this quasi-mathematical structure is intentional
The n eed is rather for a
with Plato is hardly in need of support.
detailed examination of the similarities as well as the differences.
First we note that the E-H-h-E pattern is common to both halves.
The significance of this lies in the fact that it reveals a pattern
of interwovenness between reason and eros which shows neither the
dominance of one over the other, nor a simple cycle of love moving

reason and vice versa (that would be the E-R-E-R pattern).
Further
more, we should notice that t his division into halves corresponds to
the first t wo levels of the ascent.
Each half represents the sum of
This shows that there is an
all steps taken on a certain plane.
E-h-R-E sequence on each level, and furthermore it shows that the
transition from the first to t he second level is the work of eras and
In
not the work of reason; it is an E-E move, within our scheme.

addition to these general parallels a comparison of the corresponding
individual steps reveals further striking similarities.
Both El and
E3 are positive steps of eros, and both initiate a sequence of steps
on a certain given plane.
Furthermore, both of these, and these
alone within the first two-third of the path, are linked to acts of
creation.
I would like to claim also that both steps are manifesta
tions of eros toward something particular, and not to something

general.
This is quite clear in the case of El, but might be dis
puted in the case of E3.
The first part of t his step seems to be a
But it
description of a general preference of one kind to another.
seems to me that reading this in conjunction with what follows,

the

key description is that of a man loving and caring for a single soul,
preferring i ts b eauty, no matter how meager, to the possibly more
vivid beauty o f other humans on the physical and aesthetic plane.

Along with these similarities we find also a significant difference.
El is purely positive, whereas E3, since it involves a preference,
In connection with this we should realize that
is partly neg ative.
E3 is the only step in the section which is 11trans-categorical11•

Turning now to E2 and E4, we see at once that both contain a dis
tinctly negative element, and that both complete a sequence of steps
The differences, however, are more striking t han
on a given level.

in the case of the other couple of E-steps.
For E2 is only partly
negative whereas E4 is completely so; and while E2 is negative toward
something particular, E4 shows a negative attitude toward a whole
class.
I shall try to account for these differences below, as re
vealing something about the difference between the first and second
levels of the ascent.
In general one might conclude that the E-steps
seem to have roughly the same function in each of t he segments.

This brings us to the comparison of the R-steps in the two seg
ments.
It seems to me that Rl and R3, as well as h2 and R4, perform
roughly parallel functions.
Both hl and R3 involve the contemplation
of a plurality of related entities,

and both R2 and R4 involve the

discovery of some sort of unity within this plurality.

R.G. Bury

had probably this in mind when he identified the r ole of 11nous" in
this passage as that of identification and generalization.5
This
realization also places in proper light the relationship between the
11ascent11-passage and the 11Divided Line" of the Republic. . The mathe
matical imagination used is basically the same,

but the nature of the
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of beauty on the spiritual level.
This move is made possible by the
previous conditioning of reason and it leads, in turn, to a further
conditioning of 11nous".
This mutu al causal influence between reason
and eros is s ignificant.
It demonstrates on the one hand that Plato
did not subscribe to the "reason is but a slave of the passions11 type
It shows also, on the other h and, that Plato was n ot an
of view.
extreme rationalist in the sense that he did not regard the role of
reason as consisting simply of repressing the erotic side of human
nature.
Indeed, this ballance between reason and eros raises some
questions as to the nature of eros.
For in the Phaedo as well as in
other middle period dialogues this repressive and controlling func
tion of reason is brought out.
How are we then to think of eros in
the §ymposium?
In view of the above, one could hardly equate it with
either the second or the third part of the soul within the trichotomy
of the Republic.
It seems to me equally clear that it is a notion
much more narrow than our usual conception of 'emoti on' w hich we con
trast with reason.
Finally, given t he mutual causal relations, we
cannot regard eros as th� motivating factor underlying all burnan
actions.

On the positive side,

however,

we

can say this about eros.
It

It is con ditioned by reason and is in turn conditioning reason.
is "trans-categorical11•
Pinally, it is not mere love or desire,
affection toward something in view of the nature of that object.

but

It seems t o me not inappropriate to sum up the positive side of this
account as showing that eros is what we c all 11 aspiration" as opposed
to mere love or desire.
One might venture to s ay that one of the

crucial tasks of the Platonic 11paideia11 is the t ransformation of mere
desire into aspiration.
The crucial difference here is between tak
ing something as a mere object of immediate s atisfaction and t aking
something as an object of satisfaction on account of its nature.

The latter move requires the intervening of reason and may lead to the
contemplation of that nature, a nd t hen to the development of a new
desir e which wi th the help of further intervening on the part of rea
son will become an aspiration.

Brief reflexion should convince us that there are a great var
iety of aspirations, and that consequently eros, as interpreted here,
is not one universal force;

rather,

the name

1eros

1

is used to desig

nate a variety of impulses and processes which have the above men
In other wo rds, I am sug
tioned t hree characteristics in common.
gesting that eros is nothing "over and above" t he sum of all E-steps.
It is not a force behind the E-steps.
This is not the usual way of
reading this passage, nor is it the traditional Greek way of looking
at concepts like eros.
The l anguage of the hymns of praise in this
dialogue suggests that eros is to b e thought of as one force with

many different manifestations.
This is the way Plato's predecessors
thought of all the 11daemonic11 forces wh ich hold sway over man.
But
on the basis of the interpretation given above I suggest that Plato

poured new life into the traditional framework.
According to the
usually accepted version the ascent is a sort of ontological e levator,
powered by eros,

stopping at the various levels which Plato indicates.

This interpretation either fuses the notions of eros and "nous'', or
leaves eros as t he only motivating power.
In either case, it repre
If, however,
sents Plato's psychology as something rather primitive.
we view the various steps as events which effect causally one another,

'""
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then there is no more reason for t he postulation of eras as an ad

ditional entity, and we have in outline a psychological t heory which
is complex, plausible, and accounts adequately for the variety of

factors w hich relate causally to human action.
The interplay of rea
son and eros, as presented, is along the lines of t he principle of
internal harmony which

is stressed so much in the Republic.

eros stands simply for t he wide variety of a spirations which
thinks of as the n ecessary accompaniments to the

Thus

Plato

1tlife of reason11

which he envisages both as a moral ideal a nd as a scheme wi thin which
knowledge can be

gained.

To complete the interpretation of the lower part of the ascent,

we have to deal w ith the acts of creation which are built into the

In view of the fact that there are only three steps related

pattern.

to creation in the entire ascent,
especially
"lower"

we shall deal w ith all of these;

since it is my conviction that the interpretation of the

acts of creation depends on how one takes all three of these.

The path which precedes the perception of the Forms can be divided

as moving on three planes:

tellectual.
with

it.

the aesthetic,

the social,

and the in

Each of t hese levels has one act of creation associated

The first two creations are linked with steps of eras

and E3) and only the third one is part of an

R-step

(El

(R6) thus sug

gesting that only the t hird type of creation is a work of pure reason�

Ye � all three kinds of creations are described as the creation of

" AO�;.OS'"

(210a8,

cl,

d5).

It seems most likely that the kind of

dis�ourse pr oduced is intrinsically connected w ith the kind of step
to which its creation is linked,

with the level on which it appears,

and with the degree of rational insight which the soul at that parti
In the light of this consideration it seems
cular stage possesses.
best

to identify the first discourse wi th poetry,

moral edi fication

(of the type that

the second with

Cephalus gives in Bk.I of the

Republic) and the third with science an d dialectic

fication is made explicitly by

R-

Plato in B6).

(this last identi

The creation of discourse is causally depen dent on the set of

and E-steps which appear on any

given plane.

In addition to that,

these discourses play a role in the causal chain which makes up the
upward path.

Attention to poetry may inspire love,

but it can also

turn the mind toward the characteristics of the loved object,

lead to the c ontemplation of aesthetic beauty in general.
second level again,
soul

or souls,

and thus

On the

moral edification turns attention not only to a

but to their nature;

moral edification deals with,

it is thei r characteristics that

and attention to these characteristics

can redirect eros as well as reason.

Finally,

it is hardly n ecessary

to point out the influence that the third type of discourse has on

the soul.

In this manner the acts of creation play an integral part

in the sequence wh ich leads to the apprehension of the Form of beauty.
The consideration of the acts of creation led us to a part of the

upper third of the ascent.

to this segment.

It is time to t urn all of our attention

There are three ways in which the upper one-third is

different from the other two parts of the ascent.
It is not intro
duced by a positive E-step, nor are there E-steps wi thin the sequence..
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Finally, the relationships between the R-steps seem to be different
from those exhibited by the sequences of R-steps wi thin the lower
The first two differences are due to the entire
parts of the ascent.
Does this absence in
lack of E-steps within this part of the path.
dicate that the soul in these final stages is without eros?
To con
ceive of the beroe of this philosophic odyssey as a man without pas
sion, 11apatbetic11, strikes one as utterly un-Greek, and s uch a con
ception is also difficult to reconcile with the creation o f philosophy
(within R6)

and t he 11 giving birth of true v irtue

11

(212a) vvhich Plato
Bury, for one, insisted that eros is
still at work in the last part of the path,6 but he d id not account
for the absence of E-steps - indeed this way of phrasing the question
Now it seems to me that the pres
can not be fou nd in his writings.
ence or absence of E-steps do not determine whether or not there is
places wi thin the last part.

eras in the soul; we may assume that Plato did not think of any stage
of t he human life as utterly with out eros.
V1hat the absence of E-

steps indicates in the upper part is that eras here no longer func
tions as a guide.
This explains also the difference between t he other
contestants w ho praise love as a supreme deity and Socrates who makes

it quite clear that he is not doing this.
He does not bestow upon
love t he superlatives w hich the others failed to spare; he places
love in the 11 intermediate 11 category.
At the end (212b7-c3) he says
that he praised eros 11as much as he is able to11 and he confesses to

Phaedrus that this is the best he can do for eros, though Phaedrus
The irony of these
might not even want to call this a hymn of praise.
lines is explained n ot only by the whole t reatment of eros in the
speech, but especially by Socrates' calling eros the 11best co-worker

of human nature" (212b2-4).
The 11phusis" referred to here is clearly
reason, and e ros is aptly regarded as its b est helper.
Eros can
serve as a guide, b ut only up to a point.
This parallels t he treat
ment of Virgil ln Dante's 11Divine Comedy".
This explanation of the role of eros still leaves us wi th the
question o f how the 11trans-categorical11 move from the so cial to the

intellectual is possible without E-steps.

Certainly E4

does n othing

more than turn the erotic from the aesthetic and physical plane to
the spiritual.
Thus while the t ransition from t he aesthetic to the
social required eros, the transition from the s oci al to the intel
lectual seems to be accomplished by reason alone.
The explanation
lies in the nature of the beauty of social rules and institutions.

This beauty lies in the fact that social and moral maxims - for Plato
the t wo are not separated - are founded on knowledge.
Our understand

ing of rules of action according to Plato is not complete until we
Thus it requires aspiration to
see their derivation from the Forms.
move from the physical r ealm to that of the soul, but once we turn
with 11care11 to the co ntemplation of the soul, our examination of its
nature and e xcellences will lead us to consider rules of action, the

sciences, a nd e ventually the Forms.

RS

represents one of the turning points of the ascent.

For the

beauty of the sciences according to Plato lies in their having the
That which is con
general and t he abstract as their subject matter.

templated at t his stage is no longer connected to the particular and
the c oncrete.
Thus we could not expect the movement fro� R5 to R6 to

,

-
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be - in parallel wi th the moves from Rl to R2 and R3 to R4 - a move
from instances to the general, or a move which enables one to see

Given Plato's conception of knowledge,
unity within a given class.
contemplation
of
its
beauty
leads one to turn away completely from
the
the instance, the particular.
And this is exactly wh at takes place
This step provides t he chief prerequisite for the ability
within R6.
to practice t he dialectic method; the "turning toward t he wide ocean
of b eauty11, referring obviously back t o the sci ences mentioned before.
This "turning" is simply the determination to think in terms o f gen

eral concepts and not in terms of t he empirical a nd the particular.
The process of gaining adequate understanding of the general i s the
process of "creating" philosophy; an act of creation wh ich is linked
How dialectic leads to R7, the apprehension of the Form of
with R6.
beauty , needs no explanation.

This analysis of the ascent has shown us bow Plato combines in a
single scheme a picture of the entire ontological landscape an d a view

of the educational process.
We shou ld not interpret the latter as en
tailing t hat each human has to traverse the entire path.
For those
whose life is dominated by physical eros each of the steps is a neces
sary condition for the attairunent of the next one.
But the more
gifted need not begin at the bottom; Plato does not rule out the pos
It should be noted also,
sibility of t he young mathematical genius.
that for any given step the traversing of the previous steps is not a

sufficient condition.
�hat combination of factors within the soul
are required f or progress is problematical; any answer here will de
pend on what Plato took to be the imperishable part of the soul,

what t his
the first
For El is
is linked

and

was is by no means obvious.
We should remember here that
step by itself indicates a c ertain degree of achievement.
not simply lust, but t he sort of love of the physical which
with poetry.
Many people never arrive even a t El.
The

progress from El upward is not merely a movement from certain fields
of study to others, but a movemen t which leads to the appreciation of

the beauty of various fields.
For Plato this means at least partly
that one has t o see how all the fields 11point beyond themselves".
The beauty of moral practice is that it can be justified on the basis

of a priori truths, and this l eads one to c onsider the sciences and
Thus the co nsideration of the
dialectic which establish t hese t ruths.
various types of beauty helps to direct attention to higher and higher
Each of the t ypes of beauty is incomplete in it
levels of k nowing.
self; it is only with the final vision t hat we come in contact wi th
the entity that is beautiful 11in itself".

It is agreed by a ll that t he object of this final vision is the
The interpretation of the c haracterization of this
Form of beauty.
Form, given in 2llal-b5, is also beyond c ontroversy.
But we need to
consider t he r el ationship between t he Form of beauty and t he objects
of t he previous levels.
The Form seems to be something hitherto

unknown.
Its perception is said to be that for the s ake of which all
the previous labors were endured (210e5-6).
On the other hand , the
Form is also said t o be that of which a ll o ther beautiful things par
take (2llb2-3).
The former description s uggests t hat the Form is a
s0preme, s tandard entity, standing alone, s eparate from all other
beautiful things.
The latter description suggests t hat it is somehow

- 9 -

�e might look fo r help to a suggestion made
a common denominator.
recently? according to w hich partaking amounts merely to approxima
tion.
It becomes clear, however, from 2llb3-5 that Plato does not
have approximation in mind when he talks here about participation.

For it is said that despite t he participation the Form suffers no in
crease or decrease.

If partaking meant approximation,

this statement

It seems to me that Plato wants t he Form of
would be unnecessary.
beauty to be both a common denominator and a standard.
This is by no
means an inconsistent position.

To say that the Form is a common de

nominator does not mean that it is a 11compromise11

subordinate levels.

or

11mixture11 of the

It means rather that all beautiful things par

take of it in some respect,

and thus to some extent.

The Form char

acterizes t hese pluralities deficiently in the sense that nothing
particular is beautiful without qualifications.8

In this discussion it has bee n assumed t hat there is only one

Form within the ascent, and that wh at one comprehends on the subordi

nate levels are pluralities of particulars.

This reading is sup

ported by Robin's observation that whereas the ascent is gradual, the
final vision comes suddenly9.
Still, this is not the only way of

reading the passage.

One might t hink th at wh at the soul comprehends

on each level is a s pecies-Form.

then a

11second-order11,

The object of the final vision is

generic Form of beauty which is above the

The language of
Forms of Aesthetic, Social, and Intellectual beauty.
210b2-3 (R2) seems to support such a reading, and this view wo uld also

bring

into harmony the ascent with what is called in the later dia

logues the method of collection and d ivision.
reading does n ot seem acceptable.

in terms of t he language of R4.

Nevertheless,

t his

The l anguage of R2 can b e explained

Moreover,

aside from Robin's point

there are two considerations which count heavily against this reading.
One is Plato's summary of the ascent (2llc).
In this summary Plato

describes the movement of the s oul n ot as one from Form to Form,

but

as a r ise from one plurality to another, w ith the apprehension of the

The other consideration is the content
Form coming only at the end.
of R6.
Unless the perception of a Form came at the very end, one
would be hard pressed to explain why the penultimate step should be
the turning away from all i nstances.
The account of the nature of the Form which was

us to th e problem of self-predication.

ing to

given above leads

It is undeniable that accord

Plato the t erm 1beautiful1 can be applied in the

sense o nly to the Form of beauty.

what sense does the t erm

Vvhat is this 11fullest11

'beautiful

sense?

1

have w hen applied to the Form?

It will not do to raise t he question of

self-predication as the issue w hether or not
'Beauty is beautiful'

11fullest11

The question wh ich confronts us is:

is an a priori

truth.

Plato believed that

It is

possible that Plato

was committed to a theory of self-predication without having been

aware of it, or without having been able to formulate it clearly.
The r ealization of all of the consequences of a metaphysical tbeory
The crucial question
is a most difficult task for the philosopher.

is this:

does Plato apply 1beautiful1 to the Form of beauty with des

criptive force or not?

Those w ho do not believe that

Plato was com

mitted t o s elf-predication must deny that he applied 'beautiful' to
the Form with descriptive force, and have to construe this word as the

..
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proper name of the Form.

-

Those who ascribe self-predication to Plato

need to claim only that be believed 'beautiful'

not to be a mere

proper name but a term applied descriptively to the Form.

It seems
to me that the view according to w hich 'beautiful' is the proper name

of t he Form of beauty is most implausible.

trast with descriptive terms,

For proper names,

bearers;

they do not tell us what the bearers a re,

citizen,

a

cate the nature of the bearers.
what be is.

loving father,

and

in con

do not tell us anything about their
To say of Mr.

they

X that he

do not indi
is a fine

a good l awyer is t o say so mething about

It is to describe him.

But

to s ay merely that b is name

It is merely to name him.
There seems to be little doubt that Plato thought of termslO like
'beautiful' as not only baptizing the Forms but also indicating t heir

is John is not to say anything a bout him.

nature.

when

This does not mean that these t erms have the same meaning

applied to the Forms as when applied to

particulars.

It bas

said recently that once we recognize the ambiguity in
general t erms,
a

non sequitur.

Terms like 'beautiful' may apply descriptively both

to Forms a nd to particulars, but in different ways.
the case,

been

Plato's use of
the charge of self-predication disappearsll.
This is
This is indeed

V1·hat may have tempted scholars into co nstruing general

terms as proper n ames of Forms is that a ccording to

Plato,

gene ral t erm designates uniquely one an d only one Form.

should add,

any given

And yet,

it does so while i ndi cating the nature of the Form.

we

Thus

we should s ay that general t erms apply to t heir respective Forms with

out qualification,
this way,

definite d escriptions.
tions they

In

and it is only to Forms t ha t t hey apply thus.

applied to Forms,

general t erms function for

Plato as

When fur nished with the suitable qualifica

function as general d escrip tions of particulars.

So far I have shown only the plausibility of self-predication
wit hin the theory of Forms.
Let us now survey the e vidence wh ich

shows t hat in the ascent passage Plato thinks of 'beautiful' as ap
In 210e4-5

plyin� t o t he Form of beauty with descriptive force.
where

as

Plato describes the object of the final vision he talks of it

"beautiful in nature11•

This b eauty is presumably indicated by the

term 'beautiful' as applied to the Form;

term were m erely a proper name.

contrast with the particulars,
and ugly.

Obviously,

but it could not be if the

In 2lla it is s aid that the Form,

cannot be s aid t o be both beautiful

in

Plato is not ruling out the absurd possibility

that both 'beautiful' and 'ugly' should be proper names of the same

Form.

Rather,

be is concerned to say that only one of these descrip

tions apply to the Form of beauty.

Again in 2llb2 Plato talks of all

the other beautiful things partaking of the

Beautiful.

Finally,

it

is worth-mentioning 2llcl-2 where t he many beautiful things with which
we start the ascent are contrasted with this 11beautiful11

for the sake

Only the mo�t tortuous reading
(2llc2) in
of the Greek will make a proper name out of "TOV
of which the

journey is undertaken.

this context.

K ou\�d'

It seems to me that these passages present adequate
evidence to support t he claim that in this section of the Symposium
Plato is committed to s elf-predication.

In recent discussions the notion o f self-predication fares badly.
Those who like Vlastos think that Plato held this theoryl2 speak of

it with regret.
Those who wish to 11defend11 Plato against the a scrip
tion of this doctrine talk of it as "puerile confusion1113
Reading

-

11

-

these interpretations one might come to the conclusion that only in a
moment of utter c onfusion, and possibly poetic m adness, could a philo
sopher e ntertain this theory.
Now it would be useless to deny that
On the other hand,

self-predication leads to logical difficulties.

it seems to me that self-predication performs a useful and much needed
function in the theory of Forms, and that without it this latter
theory

hardly says anything at all.

After all,

t he postulation of

the Forms and the accompanying epistemology are supposed to explain
how we are able to describe and understand - as far as possible - the

external world.

Our ascription of general t erms to particulars is

presumably in some sense a derivation or imitation of the proper as
cription of these to the Forms.
Our understanding and describing of

the Forms is supposed to function as a paradigm of how we should u nder

stand and describe particulars.

But how could this be if general

terms are merely naming t he Forms?

Furthermore,

there must be some

thing within the nature of the Form that makes it the entity to which

a

general t erm can be applied without restrictions,

way.

power,

in a paradeigmatic

But if general t erms do not apply to Forms wi th descriptive

these applications can not function as standards f rom which all

the other applications are derived.
To explain our a bi lity to des
cribe and to understand by referring to unique, t imeless, and immater

ial entities which we can only baptize is to exp lain things only in
the sense in whicb Moli � re 1 s good doctor 11explains 11 t he capacity of
opium to put people to sleep wi th reference to its dormitive power.

Objectionable as it may be,

it is self-predication that gives ex

planatory power to the theory of Forms as we find this in the middle
dialogues.
In conclusion let us consider the

11end product"

of t he ascent.

With the Greek ideal of 11an J r kaloskagathos11 in mind we would expect
the man at the end of the ascent to have assimilated all of the beauty
of the successive stages,

and to have arrived at a synthetic vision

within which there is room for the aesthetic as well as the social and
the intellectual.

Indeed,
final state of the soull4.

conflict with

this is how Stenzel has interpreted the

Such a picture of harmony is hardly in

Plato's moral philosophy.

must be rejected,

Nevertheless,

for it does not agree with the text.

this conception
T he negative

steps of E2 and E4 indicate clearly that the successive stages are not

to be incorporated into one another, b ut that each step and each level

has to be transcended and a bandoned as the soul rises gradually higher.
The final vision is not an act of integration and coordination,

the intuiting of an entity not comprehended previously.

but

212a shows

that P lato thinks of man in the final stage as being solely occupied

with t he contemplation of the Form of beauty.

out,

As Robin has pointed

there a re many parallels between the development of life in the

course of the ascent,
the P haedo.

and the description of the philosophic life in

This places the ethics of the Symposium together wi th the

more ascetic writings of Plato.

The reconciliation of this view with

the doctrine of internal harmony w hich we find in other middle period
dialogues is a problem that lies beyond the scope of this paper.

University of Michigan

J.M.E.

Moravcsik

FOOTNOTES

_

1.

E.g.

2.

For the opposite view ,

3.

Vvilamowitz-Moellendorf,

There are,

of course,

see R.

Stenzel,

Shorey,

Hackf�rth,

and Gr'ube.

"Plato's Phaed�11 p. 12.

two ways of reading this expression.

My

preference is based on my interpretation of R-steps in general.
For a discussion of the alternatives see R.G. Bury's 11Symposium11
p. 125.

4.

The translation is here closer to that of Robin
than to the Jowett or Loeb renderings.

5.

R.G.

Bury �...E.!...__.t
.£l- .

(Bude ed. p. 68.)

p. XLVI.

6. R.G. Bury op. cit. p. XLVI.
7.

R. E. Allen, 11Participation and Predication in Plato's iviiddle
Dialogues11 Philosophical Review vol. 69 (1960) pp. 147-164.

8.

There is no mystery about how

a particular can be characterized

The def iciency is m anifested in the quali
by a Form deficiently.
Of
fications and restrictions that accompany the predication.
course, I am assuming here that for Plato only the 11simple11
predicates and not all predicate expressions stand for Forms.

9.
10.

L.

Robin,

op.

cit.

p. 69.

We have to be careful to preserve the general and non-technical
meaning of "ifvo �' <C\ 11•
This word means 11 term" in general, or at
most 11noun11 in particular.
It does not have the technical mean
ing of 11proper name11 t hough it covers proper names too.

11.

R.E.

Allen,

op.

cit. p. 148 ff.

12. G. Vlastos 1'rJ'he rrhird Man Argument in the Parmenides11
sophical Review vol. 63 (1954) pp. 319-350.
13.

R.E. Allen op.

14.

J.

cit.

p.

148.

Stenzel 11Platon der Erzieber11 p. 277.

Philo-

